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COLLATERAL DAMAGE:
WHEN SHOULD THE DETERMINATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS HAVE
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT IN
SUBSEQUENT ADJUDICATIONS?
Matthew Faust*
Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine under which a court gives
issue-preclusive effect to findings of fact or law made in previous
proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that under certain
circumstances, the determinations of administrative adjudications have
collateral estoppel effect in federal court. The Court, however, did not
address under which circumstances the determinations of administrative
adjudications should have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent
administrative adjudications. There has been little clear and consistent
reasoning in lower federal courts about when collateral estoppel should
apply in administrative adjudications, and administrative agencies vary
widely in their application of collateral estoppel when conducting
adjudications.
This Note argues that neither the balancing test used to apply collateral
estoppel in federal court nor the more formalistic per se rules proposed by
some commentators are appropriate when applying collateral estoppel
between administrative adjudications. Instead, courts should defer to
agencies, granting them wide discretion to recognize or not recognize the
collateral estoppel effect of prior administrative adjudications.
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INTRODUCTION
Mohammad Hassan Amrollah-Majdabadi (“Amrollah”) was an Iranian
pharmacist.1 After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, he resented the
1. Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 2013).
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repressiveness of the new regime.2 In addition to participating in
antigovernment protests, he began to provide medical supplies and money
to an opposition group known as the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq3 (MeK). The
MeK had initially supported the Iranian Revolution of 1979, but had
quickly turned against the new government.4 The Iranian government
repeatedly prosecuted Amrollah throughout the 1980s and 90s for his
suspected support of the MeK.5
In 1998, Amrollah received a subpoena to appear before the Iranian
religious authorities.6 Fearing for his life, he and his family fled Iran for the
United States.7 After illegally entering the United States, Amrollah applied
for asylum.8 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
(USCIS) immigration judge who heard Amrollah’s application decided that,
despite Amrollah’s involvement with the MeK, his actions had not
constituted terrorist activity, and he ruled that Amrollah and his family were
eligible for asylum.9
Amrollah changed his first name to Tom, and he and his family applied
for permanent residency status in the United States.10 After a long delay,
his application for permanent residency was denied.11 USCIS had
reconsidered its earlier determination in the asylum proceeding and decided
that Amrollah’s involvement with the MeK did, in fact, constitute terrorist
activity.12 Amrollah appealed the agency’s decision, and after losing in
federal district court, he appealed again to the Fifth Circuit.13
Amrollah argued that, because the issue of whether he had engaged in
terrorism had been litigated and decided during his asylum hearing, USCIS
was collaterally estopped from revisiting the issue in a subsequent
adjudication.14 The Fifth Circuit agreed, reversed the district court, and
granted summary judgment for Amrollah.15 The application was remanded
2. Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Amrollah, 710 F.3d 568 (No. 12-50357).
3. Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 570. The MeK, or People’s Mujahadeen of Iran, is a
controversial Iranian opposition group with a Marxist-Islamist ideology. Jonathan Masters,
Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 28, 2014), http://www.
cfr.org/iran/mujahadeen-e-khalq-mek/p9158 [https://perma.cc/W7L8-FJYB]. The MeK has
been accused of violence against both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the previous Iranian
regime under the Shah. Id.
4. Masters, supra note 3.
5. Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 570.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Amrollah applied for permanent residency in 1999 and his application was
denied in 2009. Id.
12. Id. In 2002, the U.S. State Department listed the MeK as a terrorist organization,
and in 2003 the MeK fought alongside Saddam Hussein’s forces in resisting the United
States invasion of Iraq. Masters, supra note 3.
13. Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 570. Amrollah appealed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706. Id.
Chapter Seven of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) allows for judicial review of
decisions made by administrative agencies. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).
14. See Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 571.
15. Id. at 573.
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back to USCIS, which had no choice but to grant Amrollah permanent
resident status.16
In holding that USCIS could not relitigate issues of fact or law already
decided in a prior adjudication, the court relied on the common law doctrine
of collateral estoppel (sometimes called “issue preclusion”).17 The
principle that the determinations of administrative adjudications, as well as
court cases, can collaterally estop parties in subsequent proceedings has
been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the last fifty years.18 The
Court’s recent decision in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.19
finally established a test for determining when an administrative
determination will have collateral estoppel effect in federal court.20
B & B Hardware, however, did not address the question that was raised
in Amrollah v. Napolitano21: What is the collateral estoppel effect of an
administrative adjudication on subsequent administrative adjudications?
This Note explores the difficulties that agencies and federal courts have
encountered when applying collateral estoppel from the findings of one
administrative adjudication in another administrative adjudication. Part I
summarizes the doctrine of collateral estoppel before describing the analytic
framework the Supreme Court has constructed for determining whether
agency determinations have collateral estoppel effect in federal court. Part
II examines situations in which courts and agencies have had to determine
the collateral estoppel effect of a prior agency decision on a subsequent
adjudication by the same agency or another agency with overlapping
jurisdiction. It examines a range of cases to show that courts have failed to
provide clear guidance or resolve the tensions between collateral estoppel
and administrative law. Part III discusses possible solutions, including
whether the Court’s current collateral estoppel framework can be expanded
to encompass administrative adjudications and whether courts should adopt
a set of per se rules governing when an agency’s decision has collateral
estoppel effect in subsequent adjudications. Finally, Part IV argues that,
given the complexities of agency adjudications and the broad discretion
federal agencies enjoy, agencies should be allowed to determine whether to
rely on collateral estoppel on a case-by-case basis.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT
In order to understand the problems that arise when applying collateral
estoppel in administrative adjudications, it is first necessary to understand
the four-factor analysis that federal courts use to decide whether collateral
estoppel applies. Then, it is necessary to understand how this basic analysis

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
See id. at 571–73.
See infra Part I.B.
135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
See infra Part I.B.3.
710 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2013).
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has been modified and applied by the Supreme Court when determining the
collateral estoppel effect of agency determinations.
Part I.A describes the factors that courts normally consider when
applying collateral estoppel, as well as the policy considerations that caused
the courts gradually to expand the use of issue preclusion. Part I.B traces
the evolution of the Court’s reasoning on the collateral estoppel effect of
administrative adjudications, starting with United States v. Utah
Construction & Mining Co.,22 through University of Tennessee v. Elliot23
and Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino,24 culminating with
the Court’s recent decision in B & B Hardware, in which the Court
attempted to synthesize the reasoning from its earlier cases into a two-step
analysis.
A. Collateral Estoppel Effect
of Judicial Determinations in Federal Court
Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine under which a court gives
preclusive effect to findings of fact or law made in previous proceedings.25
In determining whether to apply collateral estoppel, courts generally rely on
a four-factor test: First, is the issue identical to the issue in the previous
proceeding? Second, was the issue necessary to the judgment in the
previous proceeding? Third, was the issue fully and fairly litigated? And
finally, did the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted
have the opportunity to contest the issue?26 Courts have broad discretion in
deciding how much weight to give each factor in the administrative
context.27 Courts balance the interests of justice against the underlying
22. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
23. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
24. 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
25. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979) (explaining the
doctrine of collateral estoppel); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522,
525 (1931); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1924) (extending collateral
estoppel to matters of law when the parties are identical); Cromwell v. Cty. of Sacramento,
94 U.S. 351, 354 (1877) (establishing collateral estoppel). See generally Austin Wakeman
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942). Scott relies heavily on
Cromwell, distinguishing collateral estoppel from the related doctrine of res judicata. Id. at
3–4. Res judicata precludes the relitigation of claims, whereas collateral estoppel precludes
the relitigation of the individual issues collateral to those claims. Id.
26. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 493 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that the issue must be identical for collateral estoppel to apply);
Montana, 440 U.S at 153 (holding that the issue must be identical and have been necessary
to prior judgment, and the party against whom estoppel is asserted must have exercised some
control over the litigation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST.
1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”); see
also Brian Levine, Note, Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the
Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 1999
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 435, 439.
27. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1995); Facchiano v. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 859 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that collateral estoppel should be applied
flexibly in the administrative context).
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policy goal of collateral estoppel, which is to provide finality between
parties on the disputed issue.28
Since the start of the twentieth century, courts have become increasingly
willing to allow the use of collateral estoppel.29 Initially, collateral estoppel
only applied when both parties were identical or, at the very least, in privity
with one another.30 In addition to this “mutual” collateral estoppel, courts
allowed “non-mutual” collateral estoppel, satisfied only where the party
who is to be estopped was privy to the previous proceeding.31 This
liberalization also has extended collateral estoppel effect to “nontraditional”
proceedings, such as arbitrations and administrative adjudications.32
B. The Collateral Estoppel Effect
of Administrative Determinations in Federal Court
The expansion of the application of collateral estoppel gradually came to
encompass administrative as well as judicial decisions.33 Beginning in
1966, the Court developed a line of cases that suggested administrative
adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent cases in
federal court and then defined under which circumstances an agency’s
decision could have issue preclusive effect.34
Part I.B.1 examines the Utah Construction decision and the Court’s
suggestion that administrative decisions could have collateral estoppel
effect. Then Part I.B.2 analyzes how the Court began to develop specific
guidelines for the application of collateral estoppel in subsequent cases.
Lastly, Part I.B.3 discusses the Court’s recent decision in B & B Hardware,
which finally outlined a clear test to determine when administrative agency
decisions have collateral estoppel effect in federal court.

28. See, e.g., Montana, 440 U.S. at 153–54 (“To preclude parties from contesting
matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries
from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”);
Scott, supra note 25, at 2.
29. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971)
(noting “mutations in estoppel doctrine” including an “expansion” of the use of collateral
estoppel that “enhanc[ed] the capabilities of the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but
fairly”).
30. Id. at 322, 326–27.
31. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327–29 (1979); Blonder-Tongue,
402 U.S. at 329.
32. See, e.g., David A. Brown, Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative
Agency Determinations: Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 817, 826–28 (1988); Levine, supra note 26, at 440–41; infra Part I.B.
33. See Brown, supra note 32, at 817; Eric N. Macey, Note, The Collateral Estoppel
Effect of Administrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
65, 66 (1977).
34. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
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1. The Utah Construction Decision
The Court first suggested that administrative decisions could have
collateral estoppel effect in federal court in Utah Construction.35 The case
was a dispute between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and a private
contractor in which the contractor claimed breach of contract.36 Under the
contract, an administrative panel adjudicated disputes between the parties
When Utah
regarding how the contract would be performed.37
Construction asked for additional time and money to complete the project
due to changed conditions and incomplete government specifications,38 the
AEC’s Advisory Board of Contract Appeals (“the Board”) denied the
company’s claim after an administrative hearing.39 The Board drew its
authority from the Wunderlich Act,40 which authorized the resolution of
government contract disputes in administrative proceedings.41 In denying
Utah Construction’s claims, the Board made the factual determination that
changed conditions were not the cause of the delays and that, in any event,
Utah Construction had not borne the cost of the delays.42
Utah Construction responded by filing suit in the Court of Claims.43 The
Court of Claims determined that the Board had exceeded its authority under
the contract, as it was authorized only to resolve minor disputes, not settle
actions for breach of contract.44 The Court of Claims granted trial de novo
on Utah Construction’s claims.45 The Government appealed the decision to
the Supreme Court.46 The Court reversed the grant of a trial de novo,
holding that, while the Board could not settle a breach of contract claim, the
Court of Claims had to respect the Board’s factual findings.47
Justice White, writing for the Court, said in dicta that, while the Court’s
decision was fully justified by the contractual terms as modified by the
relevant statute, it was also “harmonious with [the] general principles of
collateral estoppel.”48 Justice White noted that the Board was acting in its
judicial capacity, the parties had had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue,
and the determination of the issue had been necessary to the Board’s

35. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421–22 (1966).
36. Id. at 400–01.
37. Id. at 396–99.
38. Id. at 400–01.
39. Id.
40. 41 U.S.C. § 7107 (2012).
41. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 418–19.
42. Id. at 400.
43. The U.S. Court of Claims is a federal court established under Article I of the
Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). It has jurisdiction over claims against the
United States stemming from, among other things, breaches of contract. See id. § 1491(a)(1).
44. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 401.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 420.
48. Id. at 421.
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judgment.49 Thus, the common law prerequisites for applying collateral
estoppel were satisfied by the Board’s decision.50
Although the Utah Construction opinion indicated the Court’s sympathy
for the claim that administrative decisions could be given collateral estoppel
effect, it stopped short of stating that collateral estoppel could have served
as an independent basis for the Court’s decision.51 Many commentators,
and some lower courts, concluded from Utah Construction that
administrative adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in federal
court.52 The extent to which this applied, and exactly which agencies’
rulings were entitled to collateral estoppel effect, remained uncertain.53
2. Evolution of the Administrative
Collateral Estoppel in Federal Courts
If the extent to which agency determinations had preclusive effect in
federal courts was uncertain, the extent to which the administrative
decisions of one agency bound another was even less certain.54 Whereas
applying collateral estoppel from agency decisions in federal court required
the comparison of one agency’s procedures and functions to those of the
court,55 this analysis was further complicated when it required that one
agency be compared to another agency. For instance, if agencies had
different mandates and areas of expertise, was collateral estoppel
appropriate?56 How should courts treat the myriad of procedurally diverse
adjudications administrative agencies conduct?57
The Court began to provide clarification in University of Tennessee v.
Elliot. In that case, the Court had to determine the preclusive effect of a
49. Id. at 422.
50. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
51. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 421 (“[T]he decision here rests upon the agreement of the
parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act . . . .”).
52. See, e.g., Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d 137, 143–44 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that an
administrative ruling would have a preclusive effect on an issue before the court); Brown,
supra note 32, at 826–27 (“In light of the modern expansion in administrative adjudicatory
authority . . . courts have recognized that the extension of collateral estoppel to agency
determinations can advance the goals behind the doctrine without increasing the risk of
unfairness to the precluded litigants.”); Case Comment, Administrative Collateral Estoppel:
The Case of the Subpoenas, 87 YALE L.J. 1247, 1251 (1978) [hereinafter Subpoenas]
(“Supreme Court decisions now establish that the collateral estoppel principle is available to
litigants in the burgeoning field of administrative adjudication.”).
53. See Brown, supra note 32, at 819.
54. See Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555
F.2d 862, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (questioning whether the FTC’s
decisions could be given preclusive effect against another agency). But see Subpoenas, supra
note 52, at 1252 (“Taken together with the Court’s decision in Sunshine [Anthracite Coal
Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940)], Utah Construction binds one agency to the
administrative adjudications of another.”).
55. See Brown, supra note 32, at 818–19.
56. Compare Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1979)
(dismissing argument that the FTC was estopped from bringing an enforcement action
because of a prior Post Office decision), with Kramer, 803 F.2d at 901 (suggesting that the
Constitution may require agencies to recognize one another’s decisions).
57. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
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state agency proceeding on issues in a federal discrimination suit.58 The
Court began its analysis by examining the provisions of Title VII59 under
which the federal claims had been brought.60 Title VII required the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to give “substantial
weight”61 to state or local authorities’ determinations. The Court concluded
that, had the complaint been filed with the EEOC and not in federal court,
the EEOC would have had to consider the state agency’s position but not
give it preclusive effect.62 Holding that what did not bind a federal agency
could not bind a federal court, the Court rejected the university’s invocation
of collateral estoppel based on the state agency adjudication.63
Though the Court confirmed that agency determinations were entitled to
collateral estoppel effect in federal court when the agency acted in a
“judicial capacity,”64 the decision was, like Utah Construction, based on
narrow statutory grounds that were not widely applicable in other
contexts.65 Furthermore, the involvement of federalism issues complicated
the Court’s analysis of collateral estoppel.66
The Court returned to the issue of collateral estoppel in Astoria. Astoria
involved an age discrimination complaint that originally had been filed with
the EEOC, but was referred to a New York state agency under a work
sharing agreement.67 The state agency denied Angelo Solimino’s claim,
and he subsequently filed a complaint in federal court.68 The federal
district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion, citing the
collateral estoppel effect of the state agency’s determinations of fact and
law.69 The Second Circuit reversed the district court on the grounds that
collateral estoppel was not appropriate in the circumstances of the case.70
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s reversal, holding that
there was a presumption that administrative agencies’ determinations were
entitled to collateral estoppel effect when they acted in a “judicial

58. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986).
59. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
60. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 795.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b (2012).
62. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 795–96.
63. Id. at 796.
64. Id. at 797.
65. Id. at 795 (noting that “it would make little sense for Congress to write such a
provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title VII actions in
federal court”).
66. See id. at 794. The Court held that it was bound to give the state agency decisions
the same effect in federal court as they had in state court. Id. at 799.
67. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106 (1991).
68. Id. at 106–07.
69. Id. at 107. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Astoria Federal
Savings and Loan rather than dismissing Solimino’s claims, making the case one of the
application of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata. Solimino v. Astoria Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 715 F. Supp. 42, 46–47 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). The district court credited the state
agency’s findings of fact and law rather than its final decision on the claim. Id. at 47; see,
e.g., Scott, supra note 25, at 2–3 (distinguishing res judicata from collateral estoppel).
70. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 107.
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capacity.”71 However, this was a “lenient presumption”72 that could be
overcome by an explicit or implied indication that Congress had not
intended an agency’s determinations to have collateral estoppel effect.73 In
Astoria, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act74 (ADEA), which was
the basis of Solimino’s claim, required the filing of a claim with the state
agency before filing in federal court.75 The Court reasoned that, if
collateral estoppel were applied, it would effectively make it impossible to
pursue ADEA claims in federal court.76 As Congress had clearly
contemplated the availability of federal remedies in the ADEA, the Court
concluded that the state agency’s decision could not have collateral estoppel
effect.77
Despite not granting collateral estoppel effect to the agency
determination, Astoria’s reasoning actually strengthened the case for the
courts to find that administrative adjudications had collateral estoppel
effect.78 Before Astoria, courts could still plausibly claim that according an
agency determination collateral estoppel effect was entirely within a court’s
discretion.79 After Astoria, however, the lower courts had to recognize the
presumption that agencies were authorized to make adjudicative
determinations with collateral estoppel effect.80 The reasoning of the case
also differed from Utah Construction in that it did not rest its analysis on
the equitable factors of common law that Justice White cited as making
collateral estoppel appropriate in the administrative context,81 but instead
relied on legislative intent and statutory structure.82 Petitioners could now
argue that, not only could the courts give collateral estoppel effect to
administrative determinations, but that they were required to by statute.83

71. Id. at 108.
72. Id. at 112.
73. Id. at 108.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
75. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 110–11.
76. Id. at 110.
77. Id. at 112–13.
78. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303–05
(2015) (citing Astoria as endorsing collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications).
79. See id. at 1310 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court today applies a presumption that
when Congress enacts statutes authorizing administrative agencies to resolve disputes in an
adjudicatory setting, it intends those agency decisions to have preclusive effect in Article III
courts. That presumption was first announced in poorly supported dictum in a 1991 decision
of this Court . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 325 F. App’x 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2009)
(affirming the collateral estoppel effect of an agency decision); Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436
F.3d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Astoria for the proposition that “Congress may be
presumed, when enacting a statute granting to an agency adjudicatory authority, to mandate
adherence to the doctrine of collateral estoppel”). But see B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at
1311 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Astoria’s presumption in favor of collateral
estoppel was mere dicta).
81. See supra Part I.B.1.
82. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303.
83. See id.
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3. B & B Hardware’s Two-Step Analysis
These different collateral estoppel analyses were united by the Supreme
Court in B & B Hardware. In B & B Hardware, Hargis Industries had
attempted to register a trademark with the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board (TTAB), but was successfully opposed by B & B Hardware, which
already was using a similar trademark.84 While the case was in front of the
TTAB, B & B Hardware filed a trademark infringement claim against
Hargis in federal court.85 After the TTAB decision in favor of B & B
Hardware, B & B Hardware claimed that Hargis was estopped from
launching a collateral attack on the TTAB decision in federal court.86 The
district court rejected the assertion of collateral estoppel, and the case was
eventually appealed to the Supreme Court.87
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, applied a two-step process to
determine whether collateral estoppel prevented Hargis from bringing the
suit.88 First, citing Astoria, Justice Alito determined that there was nothing
in the statutory scheme that could overcome the presumption that the TTAB
was acting in its judicial capacity and that its determinations were entitled
to have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent proceedings.89 Second, the
Court applied the common law collateral estoppel factors, citing the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments.90 The Court held that Hargis—the
party against whom estoppel was asserted—had had a fair chance to litigate
the issue before the TTAB,91 the issue before the TTAB was essentially the
same issue that arose in the subsequent suit,92 and the issue was explicitly
decided in the TTAB decision.93 The Court, therefore, determined that the
TTAB decision was entitled to collateral estoppel effect in the subsequent
litigation.94
The line of cases from Utah Construction through B & B Hardware
created a template for deciding when an administrative adjudication should
be accorded collateral estoppel effect in federal court. Utah Construction
suggested that the common law collateral estoppel analysis could be applied
to administrative decisions.95 Elliot and Astoria established that, when
Congress has authorized an agency to adjudicate, its determinations have a
presumptively preclusive effect in federal court.96 Finally, B & B
84. Id. at 1299.
85. Id. at 1302.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1305–07.
89. Id. at 1303.
90. Id. at 1306 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST.
1982)).
91. Id. at 1309.
92. Id. at 1306–07.
93. Id. at 1307.
94. Id. at 1310.
95. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
96. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); Univ. of
Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986); supra Part I.B.2.
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Hardware consolidated these principles into a two-step analysis: First, the
agency must be acting in its “judicial capacity,”97 and there can be nothing
in its statutory scheme that states or implies that Congress did not intend its
determinations to have issue-preclusive effect.98 Second, the application of
collateral estoppel has to be equitable under a common law analysis.99
Though certainly not immune from criticism,100 this framework provides
reasonably clear criteria under which courts can decide when to apply
collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications in federal court.
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AMONG ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The architecture of the modern administrative state often requires
agencies to conduct parallel, recurring, or overlapping adjudications,101
meaning that the same party can be subject to proceedings concerning the
same set of facts more than once. This raises the risk of inconsistent agency
determinations, creates the possibility of repetitive or vexatious litigation,
and promotes the general inefficiency of conducting multiple fact findings
on the same issue.102 These are the same basic concerns that have driven
the adoption of collateral estoppel by the courts.103
B & B Hardware creates a template for courts to apply collateral estoppel
from an administrative adjudication to a federal court proceeding, but it
does not address how to apply collateral estoppel from one agency decision
to another.104 Applying collateral estoppel across or within agencies
increases the complexity of the common law collateral estoppel analysis
and raises a host of concerns that are absent from the comparatively
straightforward process of applying agency decisions in court.105 Part II.A
examines the conflicting guidance courts have given when determining the
collateral estoppel effect of agencies’ prior adjudications. Part II.B
analyzes the myriad ways that agencies themselves have applied collateral
estoppel in their adjudications.
97. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303 (citing Elliot, 478 U.S. at 797).
98. See id. (citing Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108).
99. See id. at 1306–10 (analyzing the TTAB’s decision under the common law standard
for applying collateral estoppel).
100. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 819, 851 (asserting the need for stricter, more
formal requirements).
101. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134–35 (2012) (discussing the increased overlap of jurisdiction
between agencies); Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New
Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 711 (2013) (analyzing the overlapping
jurisdictions of newly created financial regulatory agencies).
102. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1145–46 (enumerating the potential
conflicts and inefficiencies of concurrent agency jurisdiction).
103. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979) (“To preclude
parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,
conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the
possibility of inconsistent decisions.”).
104. See B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303. The Court’s decision only addressed
situations “where a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency.” Id.
105. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
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A. Application of Collateral Estoppel by the Courts
This section examines two questions that regularly arise when parties
assert that administrative adjudications have collateral estoppel effect in
subsequent administrative adjudications. First, what collateral estoppel
effect should an agency give to its own prior adjudications on the same
issue? Second, what collateral estoppel effect should an agency give the
determinations of other agencies? Part II.A.1 examines the conflicting
guidance courts have given when determining the collateral estoppel effect
of an agency’s own prior adjudications. Part II.A.2 discusses the lack of a
clear standard for courts to use when applying collateral estoppel between
different agencies’ adjudications.
1. Concurrent and Recurring Adjudications by the Same Agency
The first situation that requires the courts to determine the degree to
which an agency should or can recognize the collateral estoppel effects of
its own decisions occurs when a single event triggers more than one
adjudication by the same agency.106 The adjudications can occur
simultaneously or successively, either by chance or by design, as part of a
multi-step process.107
While this situation arises in a variety of administrative agencies,108 it
commonly occurs in the context of immigration status decisions made by
USCIS (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)).109
This is partly due to the sheer number of determinations that USCIS is
asked to make110 and partly due to the parallel and repetitive filings
required by the regulatory scheme.111 For instance, a prospective
immigrant may have to apply for an entry visa, a work permit, and a green
card.112 The requests to obtain these documents can be filed simultaneously
or successively, and the order in which determinations are made on each
request depends largelyon processing times rather than any prerequisite that
106. See, e.g., Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 570–71 (2013) (noting that illegal
entry into the United States required asylum hearings and permanent residency decisions for
Amrollah, his wife, and his children).
107. See, e.g., id. at 571 (granting of asylum was a precondition for a hearing on
permanent residency status); Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for Permanent
Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(a) (2015) (allowing adjustment of status to be filed before visa
has been granted, so the two determinations may be made simultaneously or successively).
108. See, e.g., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Saulsberry, 887 F.2d 667, 668 (6th
Cir. 1989) (examining an assertion of collateral estoppel within the Department of Labor);
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 185 (6th Cir. 1986) (examining an assertion of collateral
estoppel within the Environmental Protection Agency).
109. See infra note 115 (providing examples of immigration cases involving multiple
adjudications).
110. USCIS receives approximately six million petitions every year. Immigration and
Citizenship Data, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/tools/reportsstudies/immigration-forms-data (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/78Y7-FXET].
111. In this Note, “regulatory scheme” refers to the decisional procedures and standards
created by the agency. This is distinct from the “statutory scheme,” which refers to the
procedures required by Congress.
112. See generally Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1101–1299 (2015).
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one must be obtained before another.113 Once obtained, these documents
must regularly be renewed.114 Many of these decisions require the
consideration of the same facts and legal issues, leading parties to assert
collateral estoppel.115
The second situation in which agencies are asked to apply the collateral
estoppel effect of an agency decision in that agency’s subsequent
adjudications is when a regulatory agency, such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) or Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
revisits its decision concerning the permissibility of an activity. For
instance, the SEC may reexamine the same type of financial transaction116
or the EPA may regulate the same industrial activity repeatedly.117
If, for whatever reason, the agency refuses to recognize collateral
estoppel from the prior adjudication, the parties may ask that the agency’s
collateral estoppel decision be reviewed in federal court.118 Some of the
usual collateral estoppel considerations are moot in intra-agency collateral
estoppel, so courts use a modified test.119 In deciding whether to enforce
collateral estoppel in intra-agency decisions, courts consider whether the
issue was fully litigated,120 whether the issue is identical in both

113. A person who is physically in the United States may file for adjustment of status
before their visa has been approved. Adjustment of Status to That of Person Admitted for
Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(a) (2015).
114. See, e.g., Conditional Basis of Lawful Permanent Residence Status, 8 C.F.R. § 1216
(2015).
115. See, e.g., In re Petitioner [Identifying Information Redacted], 2015 WL 4385367, at
*9 (USCIS June 23, 2015) (dismissing the petitioner’s collateral estoppel argument based on
an earlier determination in a multistep immigration proceeding); see also Mugomoke v.
Hazuda, No. 13-cv-00984-KJM-KJN, 2014 WL 4472743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2014)
(analyzing an assertion of collateral estoppel from prior decisions in multistage asylum
process).
116. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463–64 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing
the SEC to reexamine the legality of a type of transaction that it had previously allowed).
117. See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 185 (6th Cir. 1986) (allowing the EPA
to impose higher emissions standards than it had previously required).
118. See supra note 13. Agency decisions are also reviewable on constitutional due
process grounds. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
119. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining collateral estoppel factors).
Agencies must state the reasons for their judgments and are in privity with themselves and
other government agencies, so these two factors are not generally disputed. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(c) (2012) (requiring agencies subject to the APA to state the reasons for their
conclusions); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940)
(holding that government officers are in privity with one another for collateral estoppel
purposes); United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding
federal agencies are in privity with one another).
120. See Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[Collateral estoppel]
will not preclude relitigation of the issue when there is a substantial difference in the
procedures employed by the prior and current tribunals.”); City of Pompano Beach v. Fed.
Aviation Admin., 774 F.2d 1529, 1538 n.10 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that the “agency
proceeding . . . does not meet the test that the parties were afforded a full opportunity to
litigate”); Mugomoke, 2014 WL 4472743, at *8–9 (holding that an asylum interview was not
a proceeding that could form the basis of collateral estoppel).
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proceedings,121 and whether a change of fact or law occurred between the
proceedings that would justify a different outcome.122
Courts have considered both the depth and purpose of proceedings in
determining their collateral estoppel value.123 For instance, a determination
made in an initial asylum interview does not have preclusive effect on
subsequent immigration proceedings seeking permanent residency.124 Due
to the vast variety of formal and informal agency adjudications, an
emphasis on this factor may weigh against the application of collateral
estoppel.125 By contrast, when courts consider the collateral estoppel effect
of an agency’s own determination, they are likely to determine that the
underlying issues are identical.126 Agency adjudications, as creatures of
statute, have limited subject matter jurisdictions, and the same legal or
factual determination that is dispositive in one agency adjudication is often
dispositive in subsequent adjudications.127
If the issue is identical and was previously litigated, courts then consider
whether a change of fact or law has occurred that is sufficient to defeat
collateral estoppel.128 Generally speaking, the courts give regulatory
agencies deference in claiming a change in circumstance is sufficient to
defeat collateral estoppel.129 This is unremarkable, given that it is a wellestablished principle of administrative law that agencies may regulate and
announce new regulations using any method at their disposal, including
adjudications.130 In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,131 the Court held that an
administrative agency could craft a regulation through adjudication, even in
the absence of a legislative change or formal rulemaking.132 An agency

121. See Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2013).
122. See id.; see also Duvall, 436 F.3d at 391 (holding that collateral estoppel is not
applicable when there is “a material intervening change in governing law or the burden of
persuasion”); Thomas, 805 F.2d at 185 (“At no time should an agency be estopped from
using its increased expertise.”).
123. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
124. See Mugomoke, 2014 WL 4472743, at *6–7.
125. See id.
126. See Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 571–72; Office of Workers’ Comp. v. Saulsberry, 887
F.2d 667, 667–68 (6th Cir. 1989); Dvareckas v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 804 F.2d
770, 771 (1st Cir. 1986).
127. See cases cited supra note 126.
128. See, e.g., Amrollah, 710 F.3d at 572 (noting that collateral estoppel is only
appropriate if the relevant legal standard is unchanged); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 18, 21–23 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that a difference in
burden of proof or decisional law could defeat the application of collateral estoppel);
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 178, 184–85 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that increased agency
expertise and information could defeat collateral estoppel).
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (“[T]he choice made
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
131. 322 U.S. 194 (1947).
132. Id. at 202–03.
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could approve of a certain practice in one adjudication and withdraw that
approval in a subsequent adjudication.133
Reconciling this agency discretion with the application of collateral
estoppel has caused courts some trouble. For instance, compare Amrollah
v. Napolitano with Michigan v. Thomas.134 In Amrollah, a petitioner who
had previously been granted asylum was denied permanent residency.135 In
granting the petitioner’s request for asylum, USCIS determined that he had
not supported terrorism.136 Between his grant of asylum and his application
for residency, however, the 9/11 attacks occurred, and USCIS expanded its
definition of “supporting terrorism.” This, along with the shift in public
policy toward increased security, was the basis of the denial of Amrollah’s
permanent resident status.137 The Fifth Circuit reversed USCIS, noting that
the underlying facts were the same and the legal standard for “supporting
terrorism” had not changed sufficiently to justify the reversal of the asylum
decision.138
In Thomas, the EPA refused to approve Michigan’s proposed emissions
rules, despite previously approving almost identical ones proposed by other
states.139 Like USCIS in Amrollah, on appeal to the circuit court, the EPA
argued that a change in the scope of a definition justified its decision.140
The Sixth Circuit held that the EPA was not collaterally estopped from
holding Michigan to higher emissions standards.141 Thus, in the absence of
a Supreme Court determination, courts have been unable to provide clear
guidance on when an agency is collaterally estopped by its previous
decision.142
2. Overlapping Jurisdiction Between Agencies
Courts also have confronted collateral estoppel issues when parties in an
agency adjudication seek to enforce collateral estoppel based on the
adjudication of another agency.143 These situations occur primarily when

133. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974). Agencies may
change their rules to adapt to changing circumstances and promulgate these changes through
administrative adjudications. See id.
134. 805 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1986).
135. Amrollah v. Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 569 (5th Cir. 2013).
136. Id. at 570.
137. Id. at 571–72.
138. Id. at 573. See generally supra INTRODUCTION (recounting the case in detail and
noting the dramatic geopolitical changes that occurred between Amrollah’s asylum request
and his permanent residency petition).
139. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 185.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. This conflict is symptomatic of a larger tension between collateral estoppel and
administrative law, which will be discussed infra Part IV.A.2.
143. See Crowley v. United States, 398 F.3d 1329, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J.,
concurring); Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v.
FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299 (7th Cir. 1979); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 894 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
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agencies have overlapping jurisdiction.144 Interagency collateral estoppel is
more complex, as it occurs across a wider variety of situations.145 It also
has the potential to present a problem if one or both adjudicating agencies
claim their determination is entitled to Chevron deference.146
Though the facts of the disputes about the application of interagency
collateral estoppel vary much more widely, the legal arguments that the
agencies present to courts tend to be recurring. As in intra-agency
applications of collateral estoppel, courts consider the nature of the
proceedings in which the issue was determined and whether the issue to be
determined is the same in both adjudications.147 Similarly, courts also
consider whether changes in known facts or law are sufficient to defeat
collateral estoppel.148 However, when deciding to apply collateral estoppel
across agencies, courts also are attentive to the differences in purpose and
expertise of the agencies involved.149
For instance, in Porter & Dietsch, Inc., v. FTC,150 Porter & Dietsch
argued that an adverse decision by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
was estoppped by an earlier Postal Service decision that held the marketing
for Porter & Dietsch’s product did not contain fraudulent claims.151 The
Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed.152 The court noted numerous factors
that militated against the application of collateral estoppel, finding that the
FTC should not be prevented from using its increased subject matter
expertise and that new information available to the FTC made the
application of collateral estoppel inappropriate.153
In Kramer v. Jenkins,154 the court allowed the Parole Commission to rely
on an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) deficiency determination in denying a

144. See Crowley, 398 F.3d at 1342 (Dyk, J., concurring); Kramer, 803 F.2d at 901;
Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 605 F.2d at 299; Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 894. The cases deal with
the overlapping jurisdictions of the Merit Systems Protection Board, the IRS, and the FTC,
respectively. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101; Gersen, supra note 101.
145. It does, however, affect some agencies more than others. In particular, the FTC is
often a party to these disputes, though under widely varying circumstances. See Gersen,
supra note 101, at 707, 709 n.91.
146. See infra notes 180–85 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d
18, 21–23 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that a difference in burden of proof or decisional law could
defeat the application of collateral estoppel); Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937, 939–40 (7th Cir.
1992) (discussing the proceedings to which the INS could accord collateral estoppel effect).
148. See Kramer, 803 F.2d at 902 (expressing dissatisfaction that the IRS determination
being given collateral estoppel effect might be factually incorrect).
149. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 605 F.2d at 300 (allowing the FTC to relitigate an issue
on public policy grounds); Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 893–94 (Levethal, J., concurring)
(discussing limitations on collateral estoppel based on the type and purpose of the agency
proceeding).
150. 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 299.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 300 (“[I]t deals with a body of knowledge . . . that is constantly increasing.
The government is not precluded from subsequently relitigating . . . under these
circumstances.”).
154. 803 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1986).
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prisoner parole.155 Arnold Kramer was convicted of failing to file income
tax returns and sentenced to four years in prison.156 When he applied for
parole, the Parole Commission relied on an IRS letter stating the amount of
tax Kramer owed to determine that the seriousness of Kramer’s crime
required him to serve at least thirty-six months of his sentence.157 Kramer
appealed the decision, arguing that the Parole Commission had acted
unconstitutionally by failing to give him an opportunity to challenge the
IRS’s determination of his liability.158
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority, disagreed.159 He went
further, stating that not only was the Parole Commission permitted to rely
on the IRS’s determination, but that it was probably required to defer to the
IRS’s expertise on the matter.160 Though the court relied on the same
consideration of agency expertise as in Porter & Dietsch, this time the
circuit court seemed to arrive at the opposite conclusion by not only
permitting the use of collateral estoppel, but also implying that its use might
be mandatory.161
These decisions could be reconciled on the theory that the courts in each
case simply were deferring to the agency to decide what effect the agency
must give the determinations of another agency.162 Judge Easterbrook’s
dicta at the end of Kramer, however, appears to indicate that he believes
that agencies may be required to apply collateral estoppel from other
Furthermore, in Kairys v. Immigration
agency determinations.163
Naturalization Services,164 the Seventh Circuit noted that agency discretion
in deciding when to apply collateral estoppel was limited, but declined to
define those limits.165
Other courts also have struggled to produce a clear standard for applying
collateral estoppel across agencies. In FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,166 the D.C.
Circuit rejected Texaco’s assertion of collateral estoppel based on a Federal
Power Commission (FPC) decision.167 Though it followed the pattern of
155. Id. at 901.
156. Id. at 897.
157. Id. at 898.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 902.
160. See id. at 901 (“Once one agency of the government makes a finding, the
Constitution does not require that the finding be subject to collateral attack in another
agency. Quite the contrary, principles of administrative preclusion may bind agencies.”).
161. See id.
162. In both of these cases the courts ultimately end up endorsing the agency’s view on
whether collateral estoppel should apply. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944) (holding courts should give special weight and deference to well-reasoned
agency judgments).
163. See Kramer, 803 F.2d at 902. But see id. at 903 (expressing concern over the use of
collateral estoppel stemming from an IRS determination that a court might overturn on
review).
164. 981 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1992).
165. See id. at 940 (noting the agency adjudicative body did not possess “a free-swinging,
uncanalized discretion”).
166. 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
167. Id. at 885.
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courts deferring to the agency position on collateral estoppel, the panel’s
judges could not agree on why the FPC decision did not bind the FTC.168
Arguably, the FPC had more subject matter expertise than the FTC, and in
the opinion it is unclear whether the court relied more on procedural posture
or substantive administrative law.169
Additionally, even when an agency acts within its subject matter
expertise, courts sometimes decline to show deference to the agency’s
position on collateral estoppel. In Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs,170 the First Circuit required the
Department of Labor (DOL) to give collateral estoppel effect to a state
agency’s workers’ compensation determination.171 Even though the court
admitted federalism did not strictly require the application of collateral
estoppel, as it might have in Elliot,172 the court held that “a federal agency
is normally bound to respect findings by another agency acting within its
competence.”173 The court then conducted the common law multi-factor
collateral estoppel analysis and concluded that the DOL had erred and that
collateral estoppel did apply.174 The court also rejected the idea that new
information about the claimant’s medical condition defeated collateral
estoppel, noting that even a decision that was clearly wrong in light of new
information could be protected by collateral estoppel.175
Thus, an examination of multiple cases across the circuits presents no
clear rule about when collateral estoppel applies across administrative
proceedings.176 Another aspect of the issue that courts have not addressed
is what effect Chevron deference has on the application of collateral
estoppel across agencies.177
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,178 the
Supreme Court held that courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of
an ambiguous statute as long as the agency’s interpretation is
permissible.179 When jurisdictions overlap, however, agencies sometimes
propose conflicting interpretations of the same ambiguous statute, each

168. See Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1247–48.
169. See Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d at 880–81 (declining to consider the merits of a collateral
estoppel defense because it was improper at that stage).
170. 125 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997).
171. Id. at 22–23.
172. Id. at 21. In Elliot, the state agency’s decision had the issue-preclusive effect a state
court would give it. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 798–99 (1986).
173. Bath Iron Works, 125 F.3d at 21.
174. Id. at 22.
175. Id. at 22–23.
176. See id. at 22 (analyzing a claim using the common law collateral estoppel factors);
Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1986) (comparing agency expertise and
decision-making procedures); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299–300 (7th
Cir. 1979) (considering agency expertise); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (comparing the nature of the agency proceedings).
177. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1203–06 (speculating on the effect
overlapping agency jurisdictions will have on Chevron deference).
178. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
179. See id. at 843.
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arguing their interpretation deserves Chevron deference.180 Collateral
estoppel applies to matters of fact and law,181 and agency adjudicative
determinations may contain statutory interpretation.182 This means that, if a
court gives collateral estoppel effect to one agency’s statutory
interpretation, it could preclude another agency from interpreting the
ambiguous statute with the deference that it would usually enjoy under
Chevron.183 The increasing number of agency adjudicative bodies and the
proliferation of statutes, which are administered by multiple regulatory
bodies with concurrent jurisdiction,184 increase the chances that the
application of collateral estoppel across different agencies will require
courts to address agencies’ conflicting statutory interpretations.185
B. The Ways in Which Agencies
Currently Apply Collateral Estoppel
The lack of consensus among the courts as to when collateral estoppel
applies in administrative adjudications has not stopped agencies from
developing their own methods of determining when collateral estoppel
should apply.186 There are three types of rules agencies employ. The first
rule mirrors the common law collateral estoppel analysis and is generally
applied by administrative law judges (ALJs) when considering the effect of
prior adjudications by their own or another agency.187 The second type of
rule is one of interagency deference and is applied when agencies defer to
the subject matter expertise of another agency that has previously
adjudicated an issue.188 The third type of rule is a rigid, per se rule used by
an agency to determine what effect to give its own prior determinations.189
Whichever rule they choose, however, agencies differ from courts by
maintaining a much greater degree of discretion when deciding to allow or
deny a previous administrative adjudication collateral estoppel effect.190
The first way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications
resembles the operations of the courts. Agencies that have ALJs or various
levels of appellate review often employ the common law test to determine
when to apply collateral estoppel from their own or another agency’s prior
adjudication.191 The Merits System Protection Board (MSPB), which
180. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144,
148–50 (1991) (resolving a dispute in which an administrative adjudication’s interpretation
of the statute conflicted with the Secretary of Labor’s prior interpretation).
181. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 148–50.
184. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
185. See Gersen, supra note 101, at 691–92.
186. See infra notes 191–201 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
190. See infra notes 205–11 and accompanying text.
191. For examples of agency decisions by ALJs and appeal boards, see infra notes 192–
95.
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reviews the decisions made by federal agencies to dismiss employees,
regularly decides cases on the basis of collateral estoppel.192 In doing so, it
explicitly invokes the same four-factor test used by the federal courts.193 It
applies collateral estoppel both from its own decisions and the decisions of
other federal agencies.194 Other agencies, as varied as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
have found it appropriate to apply collateral estoppel on similar grounds.195
The second way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications
is less common and occurs when agencies defer to the expertise of another
agency to decide a specific issue.196 Agencies can choose to rely on the
prior adjudications of other agencies when the subject matter presented is
complex or outside their scope of expertise.197 The actions of the Parole
Commission in Kramer fit this model.198
The last way agencies apply collateral estoppel in their adjudications is
through per se rules governing which proceedings are entitled to collateral
estoppel effect.199 The SEC, for instance, considers that pleas in criminal
cases have collateral estoppel effect.200 By contrast, USCIS has rules that
say that the granting of certain types of petitions do not have collateral
estoppel effect on subsequent adjudications.201

192. See, e.g., Lee v. U.S. Postal Service, AT-0752-12-0618-B-1, 2014 WL 5326062
(M.S.P.B. Aug. 13, 2015); Greer v. U.S. Air Force, DA-0752-15-0324-I-1, 2015 WL
4877902 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 8, 2015); Baseden v. Navy, DC-3443-15-0743-I-1, 2015 WL
4712165, (M.S.P.B. Jul. 31, 2015); Payer v. Dep’t of the Army, 19 M.S.P.R. 534, 536–38
(M.S.P.B. 1984).
193. See, e.g., Lee, 2014 WL 5326062 (“[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is
appropriate when (1) an issue is identical to that involved in the prior action, (2) the issue
was actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the determination on the issue in the prior action
was necessary to the resulting judgment, and (4) the party precluded was fully represented in
the prior action.” (citation omitted)).
194. See id. (holding jurisdictional determination in previous appeal collaterally estopped
appellant in subsequent appeal); Payer, 19 M.S.P.R. at 537 (applying collateral estoppel
from a previous Department of the Army pay increase determination).
195. See, e.g., Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., CFTC No. 98-R095, 1999 WL 325337, at *35
(May 20, 1999) (reversing the ALJ for failing to apply collateral estoppel); In re Tex. Utils.
Generating Co., 18 N.R.C. 36, 37–38 (1983) (holding DOL decision had a collateral estoppel
effect).
196. See, e.g., In re Hanover House, Postal Service Nos. 2/143 & 2/149 (1975) (relying in
part on findings of fact made by the FTC to determine whether information contained in
mailing was false).
197. See, e.g., Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting a passage
showing that the Parole Commission relied on IRS findings).
198. See id.
199. Per se rules do not invoke a balancing test, but simply specify situations in which
collateral estoppel applies. See generally Brown, supra note 32 (explaining the concept of
per se rules for collateral estoppel).
200. See, e.g., In re Michael Lapp, Exchange Act Release No. 591, 72 SEC Docket 97,
98–99 (Mar. 29, 2000) (granting criminal plea collateral estoppel effect). But see SEC v.
Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 306–07 (2d. Cir. 1999) (preventing the SEC from
giving sentencing hearings collateral estoppel effect).
201. See Denials, Appeals, and Precedent Decisions, 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (2012); In re
[Identifying Information Redacted], 2012 WL 8526897, at *5 (USCIS Dec. 7, 2012)
(denying collateral estoppel effect to the grant of a petition for a family member).
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Whichever reasoning they use, agencies generally invoke collateral
estoppel when they are faced with repeated proceedings against private
parties and when relitigating the issue is unnecessary because a record on
which the agency can make a decision has been developed in a prior
adjudication.202 This parallels the concerns of courts when they apply
collateral estoppel to promote judicial economy and finality between
parties.203 Courts reserve broad discretion in deciding whether to apply
collateral estoppel.204 Agencies, however, claim the power to abrogate
collateral estoppel altogether when it no longer serves the agencies’ policy
purposes.205
Agencies are careful to maintain that collateral estoppel may not apply in
their adjudications even if previous practice would indicate otherwise.206
This reflects a principle of administrative law, which requires that an
agency maintain flexibility in decision making.207 The decisions of the
courts in Porter & Dietsch, Thomas, and Duvall v. Attorney General208
endorse this line of reasoning by relying on the agency’s interest in
improving its expertise, developing its regulations, and achieving
Congress’s policy goals.209 In all of these cases, the common law analysis
probably would have weighed in favor of applying collateral estoppel.210
The courts reviewing the agency decisions in these cases recognized that
considerations of administrative law required that agencies be given more
leeway and not be so rigidly bound by past decisions.211

202. See, e.g., Lee v. U.S. Postal Service, AT-0752-12-0618-B-1, 2014 WL 5326062
(M.S.P.B. Aug. 13, 2015) (applying collateral estoppel to prevent the matter from being
litigated for a third time); In re Tex. Utils. Generating Co., 18 N.R.C. 36, 37–38 (1983)
(holding the previously conducted DOL fact finding process was sufficient to have collateral
estoppel effect).
203. See supra note 103.
204. See supra note 27.
205. See, e.g., supra note 201; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (AM. LAW
INST. 1982) (noting as an exception to the general rule that agencies may relitigate issues
when invocation of collateral estoppel is inconsistent with legislative policy).
206. For instance, the MSPB decisions recognizing collateral estoppel carry a heading
disclaiming their precedential value. See Lee, 2014 WL 5326062. USCIS also specifically
denies that its use of collateral estoppel in unpublished decisions can support its use in other
cases. See In re Petitioner [Identifying Information Redacted], 2015 WL 4385367, at *9
(USCIS June 23, 2015) (noting that “unpublished decisions are not . . . binding”).
207. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (“[T]he agency must
retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is
to be effective.”).
208. 436 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2006).
209. See Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 390–91 (3d Cir. 2006); Michigan v.
Thomas, 805 F.2d 178, 179–80 (6th Cir. 1986); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294,
299–300 (7th Cir. 1979).
210. For instance, in Duvall, USCIS was allowed to relitigate an issue after government
error resulted in an outcome that was clearly erroneous (the USCIS attorney at the initial
deportation hearing failed to present evidence showing Duvall, a Jamaican national, was an
alien). Duvall, 436 F.3d at 383–84, 391. In United States v. Moser, the Court held that
collateral estoppel prevented the government from relitigating after an unappealed legal error
led to a clearly erroneous outcome. 266 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1924).
211. See supra note 209.
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III. THREE MODELS FOR APPLYING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS
Part III explores three analytic frameworks for determining when
administrative adjudications have collateral estoppel effect on subsequent
adjudications. Part III.A examines the Court’s reasoning in B & B
Hardware and discusses the applicability of this analysis in administrative
adjudications. This view flows from the generally held assumption among
commentators that whatever has the power to bind a federal court can bind
a federal agency.212 Therefore, any agency decision that would have
collateral estoppel effect in federal court under the B & B Hardware
analysis would also collaterally estop parties in subsequent administrative
adjudications.213
Part III.B considers a second approach, which rejects the case-by-case
analysis in favor of per se rules. These rules would explicitly determine
when an agency adjudication would have collateral estoppel effect in
subsequent agency adjudications.214 Commentators who are dissatisfied by
the uncertainty in the application of collateral estoppel created by courts’
reliance on multifactor tests often have advocated this view.215
Part III.C discusses the third approach, which is to allow each agency to
decide which adjudicative determinations it will recognize as giving rise to
collateral estoppel. This approach relies on current administrative and
regulatory mechanisms to ensure that agency decisions are fair. It also
relies on interagency cooperation mechanisms to ensure that agency
findings are consistent with one another, with courts intervening only as
referees of last resort in case of an intractable disagreement between
agencies.216
A. The B & B Hardware Approach
This approach creates one standard for the application of collateral
estoppel in federal proceedings. It applies the two-step B & B Hardware
analysis to determine the collateral estoppel effect of administrative
determinations in subsequent administrative adjudications. Part III.A.1
describes the framework, and Part III.A.2 discusses its benefits and
drawbacks.
1. B & B Hardware Applied to Administrative Adjudications
After the Utah Construction Court suggested that administrative
adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in court, courts and
commentators assumed that this also meant that administrative
adjudications could have collateral estoppel effect in other administrative

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See infra notes 217–23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 224–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 274–77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 262–73 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.C.

2902

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

adjudications.217 Administrative Collateral Estoppel: The Case of the
Subpoenas was one of the early academic considerations of how courts
should apply collateral estoppel in the administrative context.218 It
examined the wide divergence of concurring and dissenting opinions
expressed by the D.C. Circuit in Texaco and dealt with the issue of whether
Utah Construction authorized the use of collateral estoppel in
administrative adjudications summarily, determining that it did by
implication.219 Subsequent academic works, including the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, also contained this assumption.220
The Court endorsed this view indirectly in Astoria by holding that, when
an administrative determination is not binding on a federal agency, it cannot
be binding on a federal court.221 This seemed to imply a congruity between
an administrative agency’s adjudicatory power to bind courts and its power
to bind other agencies.222 If this implied congruity is extended, B & B
Hardware can be used to govern the use of collateral estoppel in
administrative adjudications.223
Under B & B Hardware, courts and agencies would use a two-step
analysis. They would first determine whether an agency’s adjudicative
determinations were entitled to collateral estoppel effect by examining the
statutory scheme.224 Then courts would determine if collateral estoppel
was appropriate in the specific situation using a common law analysis.225
The First Circuit’s reasoning in Bath Iron Works neatly conforms to this
template.226 In that case, the court first examined the statutory scheme and
discussed whether decisions made under the Longshoreman’s Act had to be
made de novo.227 After the court determined that the Maine Workers’
Compensation Commission had the power to make issue-preclusive
determinations, it applied a common law collateral estoppel analysis.228

217. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1982)
(implying collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications is the default rule by
stating the exceptions).
218. See Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1247.
219. See id. at 1248–49.
220. See supra note 217.
221. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110 (1991) (“What
does not preclude a federal agency cannot preclude a federal court . . . .”).
222. See id.
223. See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Unsettled in Trademark Preclusion
Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 25, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/
opinion-analysis-justices-unsettled-in-trademark-preclusion-dispute/ (noting that the case
can be used as a “compendium” of modern preclusion rules with wide applicability)
[https://perma.cc/2E8M-C6CS].
224. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303–04 (2015).
225. See supra Part I.B.3.
226. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 18, 20–
23 (1st Cir. 1997).
227. See id. at 21.
228. See id. After a brief discussion of the complexities involved in determining whether
a state administrative agency decision could have collateral estoppel effect in a federal
agency’s adjudication, the court noted the appellee was seeking to “defend the result on
narrower and more conventional grounds,” that is, attempting to defeat collateral estoppel by
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Agency application of collateral estoppel is sometimes similar to the B &
B Hardware two-step analysis.229 Agencies often consider the statutory
and regulatory scheme when deciding which adjudicative decisions give
rise to collateral estoppel.230 Agencies, and especially their administrative
appeals boards, also regularly apply common law collateral estoppel
factors.231
Finally, application of the B & B Hardware analysis could help courts
resolve interagency conflicts involving statutory interpretation under
Chevron. The first step of the B & B Hardware analysis requires the court
(or adjudicative body) to consider the statutory scheme.232 When there is a
Chevron conflict, courts similarly look to the statutory scheme to try to
determine which agency deserves greater deference.233 When an agency
interprets a statute of general applicability, such as the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), courts do not grant Chevron deference.234 Courts
also deny agencies Chevron deference when they interpret statutes that are
primarily the domain of another agency.235
Applying these concepts to the B & B Hardware analysis, courts could
decline to accord collateral estoppel to agency findings that rely on
interpretations of general statutes, as such statutes fail to demonstrate
congressional intent to invest the agency with the presumption of
adjudicative authority.236 Similarly, when both agencies are invested with
adjudicative authority, the court could engage in an analysis to determine
which agency is primarily responsible for conducting adjudications under
the statute.237 If neither of these analyses clearly favored one agency over
the other, courts could continue with the common law portion of the B & B
Hardware analysis.238 If the agency decisions met the common law

arguing that the decisional law was different in the two proceedings. Id.; see also supra notes
171–75 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part II.B (examining the ways in which agencies apply collateral
estoppel).
230. See In re Petitioner [Identifying Information Redacted], 2015 WL 4385367, at *9
(USCIS June 23, 2015) (rejecting a collateral estoppel argument due to the multistep nature
of immigration proceedings); see also Mugomoke v. Hazuda, No. 13-cv-00984-KJM-KJN,
2014 WL 4472743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2014) (endorsing USCIS’s position).
231. See, e.g., supra note 192 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part I.B.
233. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–55
(considering the structure of the statutory scheme).
234. See Prof’l Reactor Operator Soc’y v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 939 F.2d 1047,
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding there is no Chevron deference when an agency interprets the
APA).
235. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–69 (2006) (denying Chevron deference
to the Attorney General when the FDA was primarily authorized to administer the statute);
Gersen, supra note 101, at 714–15; Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping
Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 206–07; Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 893 (2001).
236. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text (listing case law requiring legislative
authority for agency adjudications to have collateral estoppel effect).
237. See Gersen, supra note 101, at 714–15.
238. See supra Part I.B.3 (explaining the steps of the B & B Hardware analysis).
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standard for the application of collateral estoppel, the court would settle the
conflict in favor of the agency who adjudicated first.239
2. Benefits and Drawbacks of the B & B Hardware Analysis
The B & B Hardware approach could increase the predictability with
which collateral estoppel is applied while still allowing the courts the
flexibility of an equitable balancing test.240 Given the growth of the
administrative state and proliferation of different types of administrative
proceedings, a common complaint is that parties are often unsure how
vigorously to contest adverse administrative determinations.241 The
consequences of the actual administrative decision may be minor but could
have major legal consequences if given collateral estoppel effect.242 The
failure of courts to develop consistent lines of reasoning risks making the
application of collateral estoppel appear arbitrary.243 The application of the
B & B Hardware rule, with its clear analytic steps, could go a long way to
curing this defect.244
There are two possible drawbacks to using B & B Hardware to make
collateral estoppel determinations in administrative adjudications. The first
is that, as a rule designed to be used in courts, it fails to take into account
the variety of procedures in which agencies make their decisions.245
Administrative determinations made in less formal proceedings that are not
procedurally rigorous enough to be given collateral estoppel effect in
federal court would also not be given collateral estoppel effect in other
similarly informal adjudications.246 A formal test like B & B Hardware
could place limits on agencies’ ability to rely on each other’s expertise.247
This means that B & B Hardware could be underinclusive.248 It could also
be overinclusive, by forcing agencies to recognize the collateral estoppel
239. This method of settling interagency disputes could have the salutary effect of
incentivizing agencies to act promptly to issue and clarify rules.
240. But see Levine, supra note 26, at 449–50 (arguing that collateral estoppel balancing
tests are inherently unpredictable).
241. See id. at 435–36.
242. See infra Part III.B.1.
243. See Levine, supra note 26, at 449–50 (arguing that an unpredictable rule is worse
than no rule).
244. See id. at 453–54 (noting the possibility of improving the application of collateral
estoppel with a detailed balancing test).
245. See, e.g., Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1260 (noting that agencies have reclassified
proceedings as being “adjudicative” or “nonadjudicative” in order to defeat the use of
collateral estoppel).
246. See supra notes 220–23 and accompanying text (supporting the assumption of
congruity between federal court and agency use of collateral estoppel).
247. See, e.g., Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting formal
requirements on collateral estoppel where one agency relies on another’s expertise).
248. That is, it could be used to deny collateral estoppel effect to determinations that
policy considerations suggest should be given collateral estoppel effect. Courts sometimes
use this analysis to examine procedural due process claims. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons,
Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 448 (1989)
(explaining the concepts of overinclusion and underinclusion and their common uses in legal
reasoning).
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effect of prior procedurally sufficient adjudications, which would deprive
agencies of the discretion to alter their positions and relitigate in the
interests of public policy.249
Another objection is that structure of the dispute in B & B Hardware is
different from the structure of the disputes in other administrative collateral
estoppel cases.250 B & B Hardware is a case between two private
Utah Construction and Elliot have
parties,251 as is Astoria.252
governmental bodies as one of the parties, but in neither case are the
governmental bodies the adjudicative agencies whose decisions are in
question.253 The Court’s reasoning in B & B Hardware is focused on the
rights and expectations of the private parties and their need for finality on
issues.254
However, in every case in which the courts are asked to compel or
prevent an agency’s application of collateral estoppel, the adjudicatory body
is a party to the litigation.255 Often times both parties are repeat players
who are bound by statute or regulatory scheme to revisit the same issues
periodically, whether or not collateral estoppel is applied.256 This means
that much of the Court’s reasoning in B & B Hardware may not be relevant
to the application of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications.257
B. Per Se Rules Governing the Use of Collateral Estoppel
An alternative to B & B Hardware, or indeed any balancing test or
multifactor analysis, is a per se rule. This section considers the proposals of
249. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299–300 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
public policy goals can override collateral estoppel); Isaac N. Groner & Herman Sternstein,
Res Judicata in Federal Administrative Law, 39 IOWA L. REV. 300, 312 (1954) (arguing that
the Food and Drug Administration should not be collaterally estopped by prior agency
adjudications).
250. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316–17 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (distinguishing public and private rights when applying collateral
estoppel from an administrative adjudication); Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1258–59, 1262
(distinguishing the interests of private parties as opposed to agencies in the application of
collateral estoppel).
251. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1299.
252. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106 (1991).
253. In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., the contracting agency was the
Atomic Energy Commission, and the adjudicating agency was the Advisory Board of
Contract Appeals. 384 U.S. 394, 400 (1966). In University of Tennessee v. Elliot, the
University of Tennessee was sued in federal court. 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986).
254. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302–03.
255. See supra Part II.A. When a petitioner asks for judicial review of an agency’s use or
denial of collateral estoppel in an adjudication, the agency (or one of its officials) appears as
an adverse party to defend its decision. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C
§§ 701–706 (2012).
256. See, e.g., Duvall v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 384–85 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting an alien
had appeared in multiple immigration proceedings over fifteen years); Michigan v. Thomas,
805 F.2d 176, 179–80 (6th Cir. 1986) (reading the statutory provision to require periodic
reformulation of the rule); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 299–300 (7th Cir.
1979) (considering at least three prior administrative adjudications that had been conducted
about the marketing of the same type of product).
257. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1316–17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court’s reasoning should only apply to the public rights of private parties).

2906

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

commentators who have argued that the application of collateral estoppel in
administrative adjudications should be governed by per se rules. Part
III.B.1 considers whether, in the administrative context, collateral
estoppel’s equitable balancing test should be replaced with a set of
objective requirements designed to curb agency and judicial discretion and
make the collateral estoppel effect of administrative adjudications more
predictable.258 Part III.B.2 considers potential benefits and limitations of
this approach while examining a more flexible way to apply per se rules.
1. Adoption of Formal Per Se Rules for Collateral Estoppel
In a note entitled Collateral Estoppel Effects of Administrative Agency
Determinations: Where Should Federal Courts Draw the Line?, David
Brown argues that the increased application of collateral estoppel from
administrative adjudications increases the risk of unfairness and
inefficiency in subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings.259 This
risk primarily stems from the uncertainty surrounding the factors that courts
consider when deciding to give an agency determination collateral estoppel
effect.260 Brown proposes to cure this defect by creating a formal checklist
that an administrative adjudication must meet in order for its determinations
to have collateral estoppel effect.261
Brown first discusses the increased application of collateral estoppel in
administrative adjudications in the wake of Utah Construction and its
progeny.262 He then examines the factors that could make collateral
estoppel appropriate as found by the Court in Utah Construction.263 Brown
argues that the requirements that the agency act in its judicial capacity and
that adjudication give the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate have
been subject to a wide range of interpretations.264
Brown contends this uncertainty has two adverse effects.265 First, it
creates litigation inefficiencies in both administrative adjudications and
federal courts.266 Parties are unsure which administrative adjudications will
have collateral estoppel effect and so have an incentive to litigate
vigorously in otherwise low stakes administrative proceedings in order to
protect themselves from an adverse decision that could be consequential in
a future dispute.267 Additionally, because parties cannot be certain whether
an administrative adjudication will have collateral estoppel effect, the losing

258. See Brown, supra note 32, at 818.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 819.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 827–28.
263. Id. Brown identifies four factors: the agency must have jurisdiction, be acting in a
judicial capacity, properly resolve the issue, and give the parties a fair chance to litigate. Id.
264. Id. at 830–31.
265. Id. at 819.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 838–39.
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party has an incentive to try to relitigate the issue in court, if only to find
out whether it is estopped from doing so.268
The second concern Brown raises is unfairness.269 He argues that the
procedural variety of agency adjudicatory procedures, and the fact that
regulatory agencies often act as parties rather than neutral arbitrators,270
creates the risk that parties could be unfairly deprived of their chance to
truly contest the issue.271 Administrative adjudications have their own
rules, which often limit the amount of evidence parties can present, the
manner in which they can present it, and their ability to be represented by
counsel.272 Giving collateral estoppel effect to such a proceeding
effectively would nullify the greater rights, protections, and opportunity to
litigate that might be provided by a court or subsequent adjudicatory
body.273
Brown proposes to minimize these problems through a seven-point
checklist that administrative adjudications would have to meet for their
determinations to be entitled to collateral estoppel effect.274 These include
the right to counsel and to cross-examine witnesses.275 Essentially, under
Brown’s proposal, only court-like proceedings would be accorded collateral
estoppel effect.276 This would ensure both uniformity and fairness across
all administrative proceedings.277
2. The Benefits and Limitations of Per Se Rules
Per se rules would ensure both uniformity and fairness across all
Litigants would know if any given
administrative proceedings.278
adjudication has collateral estoppel effect and be able to adjust their
behavior accordingly, eliminating the inefficiency of overlitigation and the
unfairness of underlitigation.279 However, Brown’s specific proposals were
designed with courts in mind, and only secondary consideration was given
to collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications.280 As with the
B & B Hardware approach, Brown’s proposals are not tailored to specific
administrative adjudications and carry the risk of being underinclusive.281
The procedural formality they require for a decision to have collateral
estoppel effect would also be burdensome on agency decision making.282
268. Id. at 839.
269. Id. at 842.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 842–43.
272. Id. at 844–45.
273. See id. at 845.
274. Id. at 848.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 851.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 838–39.
280. See id. at 848–49.
281. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text (discussing underinclusiveness).
282. See Brown, supra note 32, at 850–51 (noting that per se rules may decrease
efficiency).
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A more narrowly tailored version of the per se rules seeks to solve these
problems.283 In a note entitled Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se
Rules Preventing the Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made
in Nontraditional Litigation, Brian Levine concurs with Brown about the
cost of uncertainty inherent in the balancing test approach to collateral
estoppel in administrative adjudications.284 However, Levine dismisses the
possibility of developing a single, comprehensive per se rule like the one
He believes that, given the variety on
proposed by Brown.285
administrative and other proceedings, a comprehensive proposal for per se
prohibitions is virtually impossible.286 Levine instead argues that, in
litigation where the benefits of predictability are high and the burden on
courts of allowing relitigation of the issues is low, courts should develop
per se rules limiting the collateral estoppel effect of previous administrative
adjudications.287 For instance, Levine argues in favor of a per se rule that
administrative adjudications in unemployment claims do not give rise to
collateral estoppel.288
Levine’s per se rules have the benefit of providing increased
predictability while still allowing agencies some flexibility.289 Some
agencies already have per se rules similar to the type he proposes.290
However, a potential drawback of these narrowly tailored prohibitions is the
complexity of the system they would create.291 Levine’s approach also
combines a balancing test with per se rules, and it is unclear whether this
would really create more certainty.292
C. Reasons for Giving Agencies the Discretion to Decide Which
Administrative Adjudications Will Have Collateral Estoppel Effect
The application of collateral estoppel is usually classified as an area of
procedural, rather than substantive, law.293 Agencies have the discretion to
choose which procedures they use, subject only to the requirements of the
APA and their authorizing statute.294 Therefore, it would be consistent with
administrative law for courts to defer to agency determinations about when
administrative adjudications should be accorded collateral estoppel effect
within and across agencies.295
283. See generally Levine, supra note 26.
284. Id. at 439–40.
285. Id. at 449.
286. Id. (“It would be impossible to evaluate every conceivable situation to which a per se
prohibition may be appropriate . . . .”).
287. Id. at 463–66.
288. Id. at 465.
289. Id. at 463–66.
290. See supra Part II.B.
291. See Levine, supra note 26, at 453–54.
292. See id.
293. See, e.g., id. at 435 (labeling collateral estoppel as “an esoteric procedural doctrine”).
294. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 523–
24 (1978).
295. See Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “the main task
of the reviewing court is to make sure that the tribunal actually exercised its discretion”).
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There are, however, two major issues raised by allowing agencies the
discretion to decide if and when to apply collateral estoppel. The first is the
concern that this will lead to uncertainty and unfairness among the parties
that have to appear in administrative adjudications.296 The second is that
allowing agencies the discretion to decide the extent to which they will
apply collateral estoppel will lead to unresolved conflicts between
agencies.297
Regarding the first concern, different agencies applying different rules,
with the discretion to change those rules, will exacerbate the unpredictable
nature of collateral estoppel.298 However, agencies exercise their discretion
to apply collateral estoppel most often by either applying the common law
standard or formulating per se rules.299 If the agency employs the common
law balancing test, which is similar to the one used by courts,300 the
application of collateral estoppel is no more unpredictable than in court.301
If they apply per se rules,302 collateral estoppel is more predictable in the
agency setting than in court.303 Arguably, this makes collateral estoppel
applied by agency discretion more predictable than that applied by
courts.304
When agencies do change the rules by which they apply collateral
estoppel, they cannot act unconstrainedly.305 At a minimum, federal
agency actions are reviewable for violations of due process under the U.S.
Constitution and to ensure they are not “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or
otherwise irrational under the APA.306 In Kramer, for instance, the court
reviewed the Parole Commission’s use of collateral estoppel to ensure it
met due process requirements.307 Agencies also are subject to other
296. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 848 (arguing, inter alia, that only agency
decisions subject to judicial review should be given collateral estoppel effect). See supra
Part III.B.1 for a full discussion of these concerns.
297. See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101.
298. See Levine, supra note 26, at 449–53.
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text (listing examples of agencies
applying the common law balancing test).
301. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (listing examples of agencies
applying per se rules).
303. See Levine, supra note 26, at 436 (arguing that per se rules improve predictability).
304. See id. at 453 (arguing that the application of collateral estoppel is so unpredictable
that any additional per se rule would simplify it).
305. An agency could not, for instance, give collateral estoppel effect to the findings of a
court that had no jurisdiction. See Kairys v. INS, 981 F.2d 937, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1992).
306. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“The reviewing court shall—(1) compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F)
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.”).
307. See Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1986).
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requirements that limit their discretion to apply collateral estoppel.308 The
Sarbanes-Oxely Act,309 for instance, requires that administrative decisions
made pursuant to it be given collateral estoppel effect.310 Similarly, certain
Title VII311 issues adjudicated by the EEOC are binding in other agencies’
adjudications.312
Agencies themselves also have an interest in acting in a rational and
predictable manner.313 Agencies are subject to political control and
oversight.314 An agency that acts in unpredictable ways or causes large
amounts of uncertainty will draw criticism and find its actions curbed.315
Even absent any other legal restraints, agencies tend to use their discretion
to apply collateral estoppel in a predictable and equitable manner.316
The other major concern is that agencies that share regulatory space will
choose not to honor collateral estoppel from one another’s adjudications
and cause parties to be subject to conflicting and inconsistent rulings.317 In
practice, agencies have little incentive to, and rarely do, work directly
against one another in this way.318 When they do disagree, there are
safeguards in place to resolve the disputes.319
Executive agencies320 operating in a shared regulatory space are subject
to presidential control through the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs321 (OIRA). They do not have the discretion to embark on
diametrically opposed courses of action that could result in conflicting

308. See Kairys, 981 F.2d at 939–40 (holding that there are limits to agency discretion to
apply collateral estoppel).
309. Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
310. See Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 325 F. App’x 114, 121 (holding
administrative determinations in claims brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are not
subject to collateral attack).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5b (2012).
312. See id. § 2000e-16.
313. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency]
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements . . . .”).
314. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1173–74 (explaining tools that are
available to Congress and the President to control agencies).
315. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
34–43 (1983) (holding that after multiple sudden policy reversals, an agency policy was
arbitrary and capricious).
316. Even critics of collateral estoppel admit that there are relatively few cases
challenging its application by agencies. See Levine, supra note 26, at 450 (noting a lack of
case law in this area).
317. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1146–48; Levine, supra note 26, at 460–
61.
318. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1155–56 (noting a recent increase in the
use of interagency coordination tools).
319. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Improving Interagency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 38 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 11, 12–13 (listing various interagency
coordination mechanisms).
320. An executive agency is one whose head serves at the pleasure of the President. See
id. at 13; Gersen, supra note 101, at 704.
321. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1178–79.
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Independent agencies with concurrent
adjudicative decisions.322
jurisdictions often use interagency bodies to coordinate adjudicatory
enforcement efforts.323 All agencies are incentivized to cooperate and
honor one another’s adjudications, if only to increase the deference such
proceedings are accorded by the courts.324
Agencies with overlapping jurisdiction generally honor each other’s
adjudicative findings or arrange that only one agency conduct
administrative adjudications, while the other, for instance, engages in
formal rulemaking.325 If all of these mechanisms fail, courts still can apply
a primacy analysis to determine which agencies’ decisions are entitled to
collateral estoppel effect.326 Therefore, granting agencies the discretion to
decide when collateral estoppel applies in administrative adjudications is
likely to produce decisions that are at least as consistent and predictable as
those reached by the courts.
IV. CHOOSING A WAY TO APPLY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS
The B & B Hardware approach, the per se rules approach, and the agency
discretion approach of applying collateral estoppel each bring their own set
of problems and concerns.327 Ultimately, however, this Note argues that
courts should defer to agency discretion in applying collateral estoppel in
administrative adjudications. Part IV.A discusses the difficulties of
applying the B & B Hardware analysis, including underinclusiveness,
overinclusiveness, and the incongruity of its underlying reasoning with the
purposes and goals of administrative adjudications. Part IV.B demonstrates
why neither broad nor narrow per se rules can create a workable system for
applying collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications. Finally, Part
IV.C argues that courts should defer to agencies when applying collateral
estoppel in administrative adjudications.
A. Problems with the B & B Hardware Analysis
This section discusses why the problems that arise from using the B & B
Hardware analysis in administrative adjudications make it an inappropriate
standard for the application of collateral estoppel. Part IV.A.1 explains that
the B & B Hardware analysis is both underinclusive and overinclusive,
excluding cases where collateral estoppel should probably apply while still
322. Id. See generally Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sep. 30, 1993) (“Each
agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with its
other regulations or those of other Federal agencies.”).
323. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1165–70 (describing joint policy and
rulemaking procedures among independent agencies); see also Gersen, supra note 101, at
696.
324. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 101, at 1204–06 (“Yet even if courts apply
existing standards of review, other things being equal, we expect strong agency coordination
to produce decisions that will tend to attract greater judicial deference.”).
325. See, e.g., id. at 1150.
326. See id. at 1150 n.69.
327. See supra Part III.A.2, B.2, C.
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applying collateral estoppel so broadly that it could impede basic
administrative and regulatory functions in agency adjudications. Part
IV.A.2 examines the underlying problem, which is a tension between the
policy reasons behind collateral estoppel and the structure of most
regulatory schemes.
1. Underinclusiveness and Overinclusiveness
A serious problem with using the B & B Hardware analysis in the
administrative context is that its first step makes it underinclusive. The
requirement that the administrative body that made the initial determination
be authorized by statute to make binding adjudications is justified when
applying collateral estoppel in a judicial proceeding.328 However, it risks
becoming needlessly burdensome in less formal administrative
proceedings.329
This issue is probably best illustrated in Kramer. The Seventh Circuit
allowed the Parole Commission to base its findings on the amount Kramer
owed the government, contained in a letter from the IRS estimating his tax
deficiency.330 This letter almost certainly would have failed to be accorded
collateral estoppel effect under B & B Hardware, because the statutory
scheme requires that the IRS finding be subject to collateral and direct
attack in federal tax court.331 B & B Hardware, if applied to this case,
would have required the Parole Commission to allow Kramer to relitigate
his tax debt before the board and the board to render its own decision.332
Results like this are inefficient not only because they require a duplication
of effort but also because they prevent agencies from relying on the
specialized knowledge and expertise of other agencies.333
In order to avoid this problem when applying collateral estoppel, most
agencies (and some courts) do not consider the absolute authority invested
in the body that made the initial determination.334 Instead, they consider
the relative similarity between the first proceeding and the subsequent
proceeding in which collateral estoppel is asserted.335 In other words, it
328. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Part III.A.2.
330. Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1986).
331. Id. at 902. In Astoria, the Court found that, because Congress intended the agency
finding to be subject to collateral attack in EEOC proceedings, it could not be given
collateral estoppel effect in any federal forum. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying
text.
332. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text (denying collateral estoppel effect to
proceedings that are automatically reviewed).
333. See Kramer, 803 F.3d at 902 (“A decision by the IRS concerning the validity of such
a claim is more likely to be correct than is a decision by the Parole Commission on the same
subject.”).
334. See supra notes 97–98 (discussing the adjudicative authority prong of B & B
Hardware).
335. See, e.g., Kramer, 803 F.3d at 901 (considering the IRS’s decision-making
procedures); Mugomoke v. Hazuda, No. 13-cv-00984-KJM-KJN, 2014 WL 4472743, at *6
(E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2014) (holding that an asylum interview was not procedurally equivalent
to subsequent proceedings, and therefore its findings did not have collateral estoppel effect).
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should not be necessary for an administrative adjudication to be able to bind
a court for it to bind another administrative adjudication. It should be
enough to determine that the two proceedings have a similar level of
procedural formality and authority.336
The B & B Hardware analysis is also overinclusive, as applied to
agencies’ own past decisions. The common law analysis, which is the
second step of the B & B Hardware approach, could effectively prevent
agencies from promulgating rules through adjudication.337 As the Court
recognized in B & B Hardware, the application of collateral estoppel does
not require that the issues presented be formally identical, but rather
substantially similar, especially when the parties themselves are
identical.338 Furthermore, even clear legal and factual errors, if not
appealed, usually are not subject to collateral attack.339
The common law version of collateral estoppel in B & B Hardware
endorses the outcome of Amrollah rather than Duvall or Thomas.340 This
outcome creates a conflict with the broader principle of administrative law
enunciated in Chenery,341 as it would enable a party to prevent an agency
from modifying a previously enunciated rule by invoking collateral
estoppel.342 By effectively limiting the ways in which agencies can
regulate, the robust collateral estoppel doctrine espoused in B & B
Hardware not only would conflict with nearly seventy years of precedent,
but also could significantly raise the cost and difficulty of regulating for
administrative agencies, such as the SEC and the National Labor Relations
Board, which use adjudicatory regulation to supplement their
rulemaking.343
2. The Incompatible Policy Goals
of Collateral Estoppel and Administrative Law
The problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness inherent in
the B & B Hardware analysis reflect a deeper tension between the policy
concerns that have led courts to favor collateral estoppel and those that

336. See, e.g., Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d
18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding it sufficient that both agency proceedings provided
equivalent litigation opportunities).
337. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
338. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1306–07 (2015)
(finding that minor variations in the issue did not defeat collateral estoppel); Bath Iron
Works, 125 F.3d at 22–23 (holding that differences in burdens of proof did not defeat
collateral estoppel when both parties had the opportunity to litigate).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 241–42 (1924); Bath Iron Works,
125 F.3d at 23.
340. See supra notes 122, 130–42 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text (explaining the Chenery rule).
342. See, e.g., supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text (describing how USCIS was
estopped from expanding the definition of “supporting terrorism”).
343. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 178, 179–80 (6th Cir.
1986).
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underpin much of administrative law.344 The difference in the structure of
the disputes highlights the difference in policy considerations when
applying collateral estoppel in court as opposed to an administrative
adjudication.345
In disputes between private parties, such as B & B Hardware and the line
of cases that preceded it, a limited number of issues are implicated, and
those same issues are unlikely to recur between the parties once settled.346
Judicial economy and basic fairness are best served by ensuring that, once
the parties have contested an issue in an appropriate forum, regardless of
the exact nature of that forum, the losing party cannot waste time and
money relitigating the issue.347 This need for finality is the underlying
policy consideration that justifies all applications of collateral estoppel,
including the use of collateral estoppel from administrative adjudications in
federal court.348
This underlying logic is not applicable when attempting to justify the
application of collateral estoppel between administrative adjudications. The
adjudicatory body, as a party to the litigation,349 is interested not just in
“winning” or achieving “repose,” but also in constructing a workable
regulatory scheme in accordance with legislative intent.350 In many cases,
this end is best served by preventing finality and allowing the relitigation of
issues.351
Cases in which the collateral estoppel from an administrative
adjudication is applied in court are structurally different from cases in
which collateral estoppel is applied between administrative
adjudications.352 As a result, the fundamental policy considerations
involved are different. The B & B Hardware analysis, with its robust
common law version of collateral estoppel,353 simply is not appropriate in
an administrative context.

344. See Groner & Sternstein, supra note 249, at 312; see also Churchill Tabernacle v.
FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (allowing inconsistent Federal Communications
Commission determinations after finding that common law collateral estoppel considerations
did not apply).
345. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 250 (emphasizing the difference between public and private interest
in finality).
347. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979).
348. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302–03 (2015).
349. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text (describing the procedural posture of
judicial review of administrative collateral estoppel).
350. See Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that
public policy concerns override the usual collateral estoppel considerations); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
351. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, 605 F.2d at 300; Groner & Sternstein, supra note 249, at
312.
352. See supra Part III.A.2.
353. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing B & B Hardware’s endorsement of the common law
collateral estoppel doctrine).
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B. Problems with Per Se Rules
for Administrative Collateral Estoppel
This section discusses how per se rules for collateral estoppel often can
complicate, rather than simplify, the problems inherent in the balancing
tests. Part IV.B.1 argues that broad, formalistic rules, such as those
proposed by Brown, would limit agency discretion in ways that are
inconsistent with the current legal landscape and frustrate the purposes of
administrative law. Part IV.B.2 points out that narrow, ad hoc rules, such
as those proposed by Levine, are in many ways worse and would actually
increase uncertainty in administrative adjudications.
1. Problems with Broad Per Se Rules
Broad, generally applicable prohibitions that rely on a formal set of rules,
such as the ones proposed by Brown, are not appropriate when applying
collateral estoppel across agencies. Any set of formalistic determinations
would also be both overinclusive and underinclusive354: the sheer variety
of agency proceedings defies the imposition of any objective standard, and
any comparison of two administrative adjudications would involve a
balancing test rather than a formal checklist.355
Furthermore, the judicial imposition of a generally applicable formal rule
would be an anomaly in administrative law because, within their statutory
frameworks, agencies are given the discretion to determine their own
decision-making procedures.356 The Supreme Court has consistently
pushed back against lower courts that have attempted to impose formal
requirements on agency procedures.357 A judicially created formal
requirement that dictated the extent to which agencies could rely on prior
administrative adjudications would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Court’s jurisprudence.358
2. Problems with Narrow Per Se Rules
Narrowly tailored per se prohibitions, such as those proposed by
Levine,359 are even more problematic. They would serve to complicate,
rather than clarify, the application of collateral estoppel among agencies
and only address when collateral estoppel would be prohibited rather than
providing guidance as to when it would be allowed.
354. See supra Part IV.A.1.
355. For this reason, when evaluating the constitutionality of agency procedures, courts
compare the value of the interest at stake to the safeguards in place rather than using any
formal checklist. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
356. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
357. The most recent example is Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199
(2015), in which the Court unanimously reversed the D.C. Circuit for attempting to require
formal procedures when agencies change their interpretation of a regulation. See id. at 1206.
358. See id. at 1207 (“Time and again, we have reiterated that the APA ‘sets forth the full
extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness.’”
(quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009))).
359. See supra Part III.B.2.
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Levine himself acknowledges that his proposed analysis to determine
when per se prohibitions on collateral estoppel are appropriate adds another
balancing test to the ones courts already must consider when applying
collateral estoppel.360 Furthermore, a per se prohibition would have to
address to which types of administrative adjudications it applied, or it
Given the sheer variety of
would risk being underinclusive.361
administrative adjudications in which collateral estoppel can be invoked,
even a single per se rule would be complex.362 This, combined with the
fact that courts and agencies would certainly disagree about which per se
prohibitions applied to which adjudications, would create a complex and
unworkable system.363
Finally, even after the adoption of per se prohibitions, there still would be
administrative adjudications where the application of per se prohibitions
would not be appropriate.364 In these cases, courts and agencies still would
have defaulted to the common law balancing test to apply collateral
estoppel.365 Thus, per se prohibitions would add layers of complexity and
uncertainty to administrative collateral estoppel determinations by adding a
new balancing test without actually replacing the current collateral estoppel
balancing tests.
C. Courts Should Defer to Agencies
When Reviewing the Application of Collateral Estoppel
Courts already defer to agencies when they interpret statutes and engage
in rulemaking.366 As long as they act within the boundaries and for the
purposes established by the legislature, agencies have wide discretion.367
This section argues that judicial constraints on agencies applying collateral
estoppel are unnecessary and inconsistent with the larger body of
administrative law. It concludes that courts should defer to agency
decisions when deciding whether a prior administrative adjudication has
collateral estoppel effect on a present one.
Agencies are already subject to a number of constraints, both legal and
political.368 These prevent agencies from acting in ways that are arbitrary
or grossly inconsistent.369 An agency decision to apply collateral estoppel
from one adjudication to another adjudication is already bound by these

360. Levine, supra note 26, at 453.
361. See supra Part IV.A.1. A per se rule would have to say something like “adjudication
A has collateral estoppel effect on Adjudication B, but not on Adjudication C” in order to
avoid the underinclusiveness problem.
362. See Levine, supra note 26, at 449; Subpoenas, supra note 52, at 1259–61.
363. Levine himself acknowledges that his system would increase the frequency of
inconsistent judgments. See Levine, supra note 26, at 460–63.
364. See id. at 462–63.
365. See id.
366. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing Chevron deference).
367. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text (describing the limits on agency
discretion).
368. See supra Part III.C.
369. See supra Part III.C.
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constraints.370 Additional constraints, such as the equitable balancing test
contained in B & B Hardware or the judicially imposed per se rules
advocated by some commentators, are largely unnecessary.371 They add
additional layers of analysis that complicate an already complex area of the
law, creating rather than solving anomalies and uncertainties.372
Furthermore, agencies are created by the legislature, as are the limits of
their discretion.373 Agencies’ power to make decisions that have collateral
estoppel effect flows from the discretion granted to them by Congress.374
The Supreme Court has consistently pushed back on courts’ attempts to
limit agency discretion with judicially created or enforced limitations.375
Where an agency has the power to adjudicate, therefore, it should have the
discretion to apply collateral estoppel as it sees fit, subject only to
legislative constraints.376
Attempts to limit this discretion are inconsistent with other doctrines and
policies of administrative law.377 For instance, requiring agencies to
recognize the collateral estoppel effect of their own prior adjudications is
inconsistent with agencies’ ability to interpret statutes and make rules
through administrative adjudications.378 Constraining an agency to abide
by the past determinations of it or another agency is against the policy of
allowing agencies to have evolving standards that reflect growing expertise
and changing conditions.379 On the other hand, preventing agencies from
relying on the findings of prior adjudications could lead to unnecessary and
wasteful litigation.380
Courts should therefore defer to agencies when reviewing their use of
collateral estoppel. This approach lacks the doctrinal neatness of per se
rules and the intuitive appeal of the extension of the B & B Hardware
analysis.381 It is, however, the best way to ensure a flexible and equitable
application of collateral estoppel in administrative adjudications and the
only approach that is consistent with the broader principles of
administrative law.
CONCLUSION
Collateral estoppel is an equitable common law doctrine that courts use
to enforce repose between private parties once an issue has been litigated.
The Supreme Court has expanded its use in federal court, granting collateral
estoppel effect to determinations of fact and law made in administrative
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 340–42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.1, B.
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adjudications. However, requiring agencies to give or withhold collateral
estoppel effect to prior administrative adjudications, either through B & B
Hardware’s two-step analysis or per se rules, is inappropriate. Rather,
courts should defer to agency determinations when reviewing agency use of
collateral estoppel. Not only does this approach allow agencies the
discretion and flexibility to apply their expertise and promote public
welfare, it is the only approach that is compatible with the larger corpus of
administrative law.

